Something is rotten in the state of Germany

Berlin still has a problem with traitors, decades after the fall of the Wall.
“The poison of betrayal is by no means as rare as we like to think of it. It’s not a nice part of our existence but it’s an entirely predictable one.”
I had good reason in recent days to remember this cynical observation on human nature and espionage as an extraordinary scandal rocked Germany and its allies.
My spy-philosopher was Markus Wolf, who had spent four decades at the helm of East Germany’s feared foreign intelligence services, earning himself the nickname “the man without a face” – which would be the title of our book.
It was the early 1990s and we were working many long days and evenings at his dacha, near an elite government colony outside East Berlin.
My assignment, as a journalist who had covered East Germany, was from US publisher Random House – to get his memoirs on track and ask him tough questions.
Over his ritual afternoon coffee and cigarette, Wolf continued his theme of betrayal. There was, he said “a class of treason that is particularly intensely felt and you do not forget – and that is a traitor inside one’s own secret service”.
“Someone you know well, who gives information to another one. This sort of betrayal is poison for every intelligence service – and the vaccines we have against it often have limited effects.”
His words reverberated last week after the bombshell revelation that August Hanning, the head of Germany intelligence from 1998 to 2005, has been arrested on a string of espionage and treason charges.
I found myself imagining what Wolf, who died aged 83 in 2006, would have made of it all, at a time of extraordinary vulnerability in Nato and threats inside Germany and the UK from Russian, Chinese and Iranian hostile operations.
The bigger the revelation, the more poker-faced the veteran spy-runner tended to be.
“Well, that’s a hammer” was often his droll German phrase when discussing some truly extraordinary incident adding secrets and espionage.
Hanning’s arrest has come as a sledgehammer to the BND, Germany’s counterpart to MI6. He is accused of paying Manfred Dankesreiter, his former chief of staff, to furnish him with more than 2000 classified documents over 12 years, starting in 2010.
Hanning, now 80, allegedly intended to use the information to prepare briefing documents for Azerbaijan. Some of the information is believed to have covered Iran’s nuclear programme.
Hanning also reportedly had repeated contact with Wang Jianzheng, who had been stationed in Berlin as a military attaché.
He has denied treason and investigations continue. But no one is seriously denying that this is a vastly damaging moment for the BND.

It adds yet another reason for suspicion on top of the history of leaks, moles and accidents that has dogged German intelligence since reunification, at a time when European security demands trustworthy alliances.
Martin Jäger, the present BND boss, who has pushed for the modernisation of a notoriously clunky and bureaucratic service, issued a statement this week on the rising threat from Russia and the importance of trust between intelligence services.
MI6, among other partner services, is carefully assessing any potential leakage of information which could identify agents or help enemy countries find weak spots in Western defences.
The aim is not to “dramatise”, as one British official puts it. But there’s more than enough drama and despair already.
‘Growing concern’ among allies
The timing of this scandal could hardly be worse, with the UK and Germany deepening their security ties under the new Kensington Treaty.
It ranges across partnerships in defence, cyber-intelligence and even prospective participation of Berlin in an international fighter jet project with Britain, alongside Japan and Italy.
Andy Burnham earnestly told Friedrich Merz, the embattled German Chancellor, in a tightly controlled appearance outside the German parliament this week that he wanted closer co-operation. A figure with expertise in monitoring German spy services messaged drily: “Well, let’s just hope not too close in the circumstances…”
MI6 is reviewing what information was shared with the BND in the period of Hanning’s alleged crimes to assess any potential damage to its “equities”. This is spy-speak for sources, human assets and proprietary data.
Other British figures in the spying game have more sympathy for the Germans’ embarrassment as they join Burnham in pursuing closer ties, especially in the development of cyber capabilities to fend off Russian aggression.

“It is just very unfortunate,” says one. “When German intelligence colleagues are changing their culture and training and the resources are being put in to improve the quality of the services. It’s a process which will take a long time.”
Collaboration has been developing. German spy chiefs have had contact in the past couple of years with UK foreign and military intelligence as they have sought expanded budgets and changed onerous laws to be able to counter external threats.
The aim on the British side may be not to “dramatise”, but the judicial process now underway in Germany will be thorough and threatens to tie up today’s BND officials in providing evidence and risk assessments on the past.
Meanwhile, Jäger’s crucial reform agenda may suffer when everyone agrees the BND has deep-rooted problems. Crises that damage its reputation and trust keep happening, at a frequency that allies cannot overlook, however much the PM seeks to warm up relations in Berlin.
Tomasz Siemoniak, a former co-ordinator of the Polish intelligence service, told the Welt newspaper in Germany that the latest crisis “will strengthen growing concern among allies about the BND and consequently could limit exchanges of information”.
“It is a subject which will feature in spy training for years to come.”
‘A man with fingers in a lot of pies’
At the very least, Hanning appears to have had scant respect for the basic rules of a secret service when he allegedly saw opportunities to feed his security consultancies with valuable information.
The bigger question for the BND, if these allegations turn out to be true, is how this activity could have gone undetected for so long. Worse, according to reporting by Welt, the infamously bureaucratic service indulged a bizarre side-hustle for a serving official which facilitated alleged treason when Dankesreiter was allegedly allowed to freelance for Hanning.
Wolf used to boast that many of the counter-espionage failings he profited from in West Germany stemmed from the fact that the security services were run “like a post office”, obsessed with pernickety processes to the detriment of their mission.
It would not have taken the counter-espionage genius of George Smiley to figure out that this was highly risky. Hanning’s tendency to maintain ties with Kremlin favourites, former Soviet intelligence officers and Chinese military figures was known in tight-knit Berlin security circles.
Hanning’s alleged scheme only came to light when his home was searched in connection with his suspected involvement in another affair in which he allegedly advised an heiress in a bleak domestic custody case.

Separately, he is accused of receiving funds from Christina Block, a German restaurateur, to connect her to Israeli intelligence services as she allegedly sought advice on how to “kidnap” her own children to secure their return from her estranged husband. She denies wrongdoing and her trial is ongoing. Hanning denies involvement in the Block case.
The former BND boss, who faced financial difficulties when he lost a portion of his pension in a Baltic banking scandal, is claimed to have become more cavalier about entangling his business and secret lives. He had been a man of the elite German state machinery – a Spitzenbeamte – with a CV stretching back to West Germany’s representation in East Berlin in the late days of communism.
Leaving the BND in 2005, he moved to another high-profile job working for the late Wolfgang Schäuble. A flinty politician who was wheelchair-bound after an attempt on his life in the 1990s, Schäuble acted as a powerful counterweight to Angela Merkel in her cabinet.
Someone who served with Hanning in a diplomatic capacity recalls him as “bureaucratic and boring”.
Others saw a more thrusting character with relentless ambitions. One person who knew him in a personal capacity says: “Don’t be fooled by his dour appearance – the white shirt and the stiff-backed look wasn’t really like he was at all. He was umtriebig – a go-getter – a man with fingers in a lot of pies.”
On retirement, Hanning launched his free-wheeling career in private practice. He spoke at lucrative security events in the US, such as a 2017 national lawyers’ convention at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington. He also created a web of consultancies and built “a wide circle with networks from Britain to the Middle East to China”.
Bernd Schmidbauer, a former colleague and an intelligence services co-ordinator under Helmut Kohl, a former German chancellor, told the Welt newspaper that Hanning was “an excellent colleague and had many great achievements to his name for the security of the Federal Republic”.
Notably, he is credited with supplying intelligence which countered the US account of Iraq retaining active weapons of mass destruction.
German espionage, despite its faults, has a strong record in the Middle East. Hanning was an Iraq sceptic and refused to back down on his service’s analysis even as the US sought to pressure allies into supporting military action against Saddam Hussein.
Schmidbauer added: “This case is a tragedy not only for Germany’s intelligence services but also one for a former top German official himself.”
A problem with traitors
I was alongside one of the most senior figures in UK intelligence when another story of a mole inside the BND caused outbreaks of perspiration in 2023. This time it was news that a top official, only identified as Carsten L, had shared secret intelligence with Russia about the war in Ukraine and the monitoring of the mercenary Wagner group in return for money.
The UK reaction then was a little more empathetic still. After all, all spy services have their leaks, defectors and disasters and Russia is a formidable adversary targeting the weak, manipulative or greedy.
“There is no worse moment than discovering that someone you have trusted has broken that trust and done immense damage,” said a security contact on that occasion.
Yet, again, there was acknowledgment of Germany’s particular problem with traitors in the face of a resurgent and aggressive Russia.
Successive chancellors indulged a “Wandel durch Handel”, or “change through trade” posture, which relegated security concerns before cheaper oil and gas from Russia and the opportunity for German manufacturers to export to China.

As the threat rose, this posture was defended with naivety and avoidance that frustrated allies.
John Foreman, a former UK military attaché in Moscow, notes that German intelligence “has had a specific problem with trust among allies, partly because of their structures and restrictions”.
That bureaucracy “has roots in the country’s history and the desire to have tight control of what the agencies can do”, he adds, “but it is also cultural and a blind spot because there has been a history of far too much institutional optimism about Russia”.
Foreman cites Germany being caught out in 2022 because its secret services did not believe warnings by the US and the UK that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine was imminent.
That left Bruno Kahl, then BND chief, stranded in Kyiv on a fact-finding visit just as Moscow launched its assaults across the country. Kahl had to be rescued by an emergency special operation.
In Hanning’s case, Foreman believes that his Azerbaijan links will require deep investigation.
The country has an on-off relationship with Vladimir Putin’s Russia from its days in the Soviet Union.
It is also “a powerful and oil-rich state which is very sharp and aware of its strategic position in the region and keen to acquire more knowledge about Western intentions”.
Cold War double-dealing
German spies unaware of what was going on under their noses was one of Wolf’s favourite subjects back in the early Nineties. His stories still haunt the BND, which during the Cold War was West Germany’s intelligence agency.
My work with Wolf turned into a three-year project. There were days and long evenings of intense conversations and rifling through thousands of files. Sometimes it was cordial, often it was tense as we tussled over fact checks and evasions, while his wife Andrea tried to soothe the mood with hearty dinners and evenings in front of the TV.
We watched a James Bond movie together and Dangerous Liaisons, which concluded with Wolf’s review: “I told you they would all die in the end.”
Tales of covert activities and the mixture of human opportunism, absurdly unintended consequences and tragic outcomes spilled out on to my cassette tapes. One theme that emerged feels strikingly relevant today: how vulnerable Germany’s secret services, foreign and domestic, have been to penetration by hostile states, both before and after the end of the Cold War.
It was under Wolf’s watch, for instance, that Günter Guillaume, whom he had hired and trained as an East German sleeper agent, was able to build a career in the Social Democratic Party and ultimately join the inner circle of Willy Brandt, the then West German chancellor, as an aide.
That became the country’s most consequential spy scandal when Brandt resigned in 1974. He had been slow to heed warnings about Guillaume, who had such intimate access to his office that he was nicknamed “the coat stand”, as he was always in the corner.
In retirement, Wolf conceded the operation had partly backfired, as the East had been benefiting from Brandt’s opening-up policies.
Another who left her mark on a long list of BND double-dealers was Gabriele Gast, another “nemesis” of the service, in Wolf’s words.
For two decades to 1990, she supplied East Berlin with reports on eastern European security and risk assessments, which were passed to the KGB. Wolf described her as the most highly placed woman in the BND. Her perceptive reports landed directly on the desk of Kohl, then the West German chancellor.
“What neither he nor her superiors knew was that they also landed on mine,” Wolf recalled.
The Stasi had been particularly lucky with Gast. Her doctoral supervisor was an eminent professor of eastern European studies with links to the BND. When she completed her thesis in 1973, she was offered a coveted job as an analyst in the service’s Pullach institute, near Munich.
As Gast rose in her role, she became enormously valuable, providing intelligence on Nato deployments, the BND’s own intelligence gathering and the Gaddafi regime in Libya.
Exposed after the collapse of the GDR, Gast was arrested in 1990 and convicted in 1991, receiving a sentence of six years and nine months in the confines of the 19th-century Stadelheim prison in Munich.
Gast had been drawn into espionage by romance but money is more often a motivation – and many people drawn into dubious activities either have money problems, as Hanning has had, or convinced themselves they needed more of it.
In the early Eighties, Wolf’s Stasi also recruited Klaus Kuron of West Germany’s domestic intelligence service, who passed crucial information about counter-espionage and agent identities.
Kuron felt that others were promoted above him and that his working-class background was held against him. He also liked getting a second salary and stipends, paid by East Germany. Ultimately convicted of “aggravated treason”, Kuron was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment.
But as is allegedly the case with Hanning, it was curious happenstance rather than effective counter-espionage that delivered him to authorities.
Lessons for the UK and other allies
Even now, it appears the lessons of the chequered history of German spying have not been fully absorbed by the state.
Yet the Cold War is back with a vengeance and as Blaise Metreweli, the MI6 chief, said on taking office last year: “The front is now everywhere.”
The risks of the West’s services being under-prepared for penetration, or letting enemies see their vulnerabilities so clearly as they can do in the Hanning affair, are immense.
As more emerges of the damage he was allegedly able to do, possibly fired by a belief that he was still owed access to secrets he should have left behind in retirement, the BND and its allies will count the cost carefully.
But one place where the story will be received with undiluted joy is in the inner sanctum of the Kremlin.
There, a KGB officer who was stationed in Germany and has risen to power on the back of domestic repression and the wings of war poses the biggest threat to European peace in our lifetime. Vladimir Putin is watching.
Anne McElvoy is executive editor at Politico and a member of the Axel Springer Global reporters network.