Why Manage My Health data breach is ‘dire’, and patients deserve better – Keith Ng
THE FACTS
- About 430,000 patient documents, some dating back to 2017, were stolen in a cyber attack against the medical portal Manage My Health.
- The information taken included clinical discharge summaries, referrals and related files, and information uploaded to the system by patients.
- The hacker claiming to be behind the breach says a negotiator is working with the company to get a ransom paid before a deadline originally set at January 15, but which has since shifted.
It’s been 13 years since I exposed a Ministry of Social Development data breach where sensitive data on children in state care could be accessed from public computers intended for job-seekers.
Data breaches have continued to occur since then, but I have seen none as dire as the ManageMyHealth (MMH) debacle.
MMH has stressed that only “a single module” was hacked. However, this “module” was an all-purpose “health document” feature for users to send documents to their doctors. Some of these documents will be intensely personal medical records, with descriptions and photos of illness, trauma and life events. Others will be boring paperwork. Sensitive data is not always what you expect.
In my Ministry of Social Development (MSD) investigation, some of the most revealing data came in the form of receipts. Pharmacy receipts for medication to treat sexually transmitted diseases, or radiology invoices for X-rays on broken ribs – when combined with a date of birth and addressed to a state-care facility – are enough to tell heartbreaking stories about vulnerable children.
Small, mundane pieces of information quickly grow into something bigger, and the MMH data breach is likely to be full of such pieces. This data is not very useful for the kinds of “bulk” identity fraud or scams that can be semi-automated or outsourced to criminal call centres, but it is prime material for targeted crimes. Embarrassing medical information can be used to blackmail. Scammers can use knowledge of the patients to pose as their doctors. Mentally or physically vulnerable individuals can be targeted for crimes.
The High Court injunction that has been put in place will do little to mitigate the harm. It might stop casual attempts to access the stolen data, butan injunction will not stop or even slow its use by dedicated criminals.
If the ransom-seeker chooses to sell the data to the highest bidder, the data would be passed directly to the buyer. There is no way to track, let alone stop, such a transfer. This kind of exclusive deal would allow the buyers to quietly find and exploit the most valuable victims, but the majority of the patients would be unmolested, for a time.
When the buyers have extracted all they want from it, or if the original ransom-seeker failed to find a good buyer, the data could be sold cheaply as a commodity, or simply dumped online in an attempt to enhance their reputation as cyber criminals. Once public, the data could be shared on private channels, on overseas file-sharing sites, or on the dark web. It may then be used by small-time, opportunistic criminals from around the world to carry out whatever crimes they choose.
An injunction order in New Zealand simply has no relevance for this criminal ecosystem. By the time the stolen data enters it, the horse has already bolted.
While paying the ransom might stop the data from being leaked (or it might not), it will serve to reward the ransomer and invite future attacks. There are no good choices for MMH here, and I do not envy their position.
However, they should never have been in this position in the first place. Most ransomware groups take a “low-hanging fruit” approach. They look for common, easily-discoverable vulnerabilities to exploit and steal data. If they don’t find any, they move on to the next target. This is because much of the risk and uncertainty comes in the ransom negotiation that follows the hack. If the negotiation fails, all the effort that went into hacking is wasted.
The ransomer in this case only appears to have been active under their current name for two months and already has seven attacks attributed to them.
In my view, the high frequency of their attacks and the targets they chose fit a “low-hanging fruit” pattern.
MMH has confirmed that only a single stolen user account was used in the attack. Posing as a normal user, the hackers were able to trick the application interface into providing the files for 127,000 other users. The control mechanisms meant to stop one user from accessing other users’ files had failed, or did not exist.
This kind of access control failure is a very fundamental one – so fundamental it is listed in the OWASP Top 10 (an industry-standard list of the most common risks for web applications) at number one.
No company is immune to cyber crime, but in my view, a company in the business of managing health data should not have fallen prey to hackers targeting “low-hanging fruit”.
New Zealanders deserve better.
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