When scam ads pay, promises are not enough – Brent Carey

So, when global platforms like Google, TikTok and Meta say they want to tackle scam harm through voluntary codes, we welcome that. But welcoming does not mean acceptance without question.

Scams today are not just appearing in comment threads or private messages. Increasingly, they appear as paid advertisements. Content that someone has paid to push directly into our feeds.

International reporting earlier this year revealed that internal Meta documents projected that up to about 10% of its 2024 advertising revenue could be linked to scam and other prohibited ads. The company says that estimate was rough and overly inclusive. Even so, the fact that such projections were discussed internally has drawn scrutiny from United States lawmakers.

When platforms accept payment to distribute advertising, the systems designed to detect and prevent fraud must be proportionately strong.

Netsafe recently ran a proof-of-concept exercise here in New Zealand with a third-party detection partner. In a short window, we identified more than 700 potential paid scam advertisements targeting New Zealanders. That tells us something important: scam advertising targeting New Zealanders is active and it is detectable.

Netsafe has proposed a pilot through the Anti-Scam Alliance disruption workstream to systematically identify and flag illegal paid scam ads, generate New Zealand-specific data and measure response times.

This is the direction we should be heading – from reactive victim support to proactive disruption of scammers in the spaces they use to reach people.

The rationale behind the New Zealand First bill is aimed at strengthening the obligations of banks to prevent scam losses. It would require banks to implement safeguards such as confirmation-of-payee systems, know-your-customer protections, urgent account freezing when unusual activity is detected and improved information-sharing. It would create a clearer duty to protect consumers, with the default position that if a bank fails that duty, losses should not be attributed to the customer.

Self-regulation alone is not enough. Banks are described as the “pinch point” of fraud and money laundering because money must move through them. If red flags light up, action should be swift.

But the scam pipeline does not begin at the bank. It often begins with a paid advertisement which distributes fraud at scale. If Parliament is debating stronger duties for banks, it is reasonable to ask whether similar expectations should apply to paid advertising systems that profit from distributing scam content.

This is not about singling out one company or one industry. Scam advertising is a cross-platform problem. Google’s own advertising safety reporting demonstrates the scale globally, with billions of ads blocked and millions of advertiser accounts suspended in a single year. Scam ads also appear in gaming platforms, dating apps, text messages and email.

The scale alone tells you this is not marginal.

But voluntary codes, by definition, are optional. Companies can opt in. They can withdraw. They can define reporting thresholds. They can determine what data is disclosed.

Without independent oversight, New Zealand-specific transparency reporting and clear consumer complaint pathways both on- and off-platform, voluntary arrangements risk appearing stronger on paper than they are in practice.

In Australia, voluntary initiatives sit within a broader legislative framework including a National Anti-Scam Centre within the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, backed by dedicated federal funding. More recently, it introduced the Scams Prevention Framework, placing formal obligations on banks, telecommunications companies and digital platforms to prevent, detect, disrupt and respond to scams.

In New Zealand, we do not yet have an equivalent framework specifically addressing platform accountability for paid scam advertising. There is no mandatory New Zealand-specific transparency reporting on scam ad prevalence or response times. No preventative duty on platforms that accept payment for advertising. No embedded enforcement regime focused on paid scam distribution.

At Netsafe, we are often where people come when everything else has failed. When users have reported scam ads to platforms and received no response, when reporting tools have gone nowhere and when money is already lost. Victims need clearer pathways, measurable protection, systems capable of dealing with the scale of harm and transparency about how quickly paid scam ads are removed.

Voluntary codes can play a role but when paid scam advertising is involved, when money changes hands to distribute content that may defraud New Zealanders, the bar must be higher. If we are serious about reducing scam harm, accountability should follow the money at every stage of the pipeline, from the paid advertisement to the final transfer.

Scam harm is not theoretical. It lands in living rooms and retirement savings. It erodes trust not only in institutions but in digital participation itself. Our response should reflect that reality.

Catch up on the debates that dominated the week by signing up to our Opinion newsletter – a weekly round-up of our best commentary.